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THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF METHODOLOGY IN
CRIMINAL LAW
Sebastian Soler'
I have observed many things in the United States that are
worthy of admiration; but, as far as my personal preference is
concerned, I do not appreciate materialistic subjects as much as
spiritual qualities and virtues, which have values that are more
real than those felt by the senses. Among these virtues, what
has impressed me most has been the interest that is continually
shown for sincere and honest criticism. Only a profoundly healthy
race, that is young and free can show such signs of vitality and
such confidence in the future.
My position is that I have been invited so consistently to
criticize that I am almost obliged, for moral reasons, to do so.
I shall not do it, in spite of everything, without first of all mak-
ing it quite clear that if it is a pleasure for me to fulfill this duty
on a North American platform, it is an even greater pleasure to
speak on North American virtues on Argentine platforms. To
address you about your own virtues does not appear to me to be
so useful as to relate them to others; and to discuss your defects
with other people does not appear to me to be so loyal as it would
be to present them to you.
Now for the subject. Although "nihil humani a me alienum
puto" the field, to which my observations have been principally con-
fined, has been that of teaching and applying criminal law. I
shall not concern myself now, however, with the practical aspects
of the problem either in the courts of justice or in the punitive
and preventive institutions. Neither do I wish to refer at this
moment to the study of criminology, criminal psychology and sim-
ilar matters. In the whole of this field there are in the United
States excellent institutions. I intend to limit my observations
strictly to the theoretical and juridical aspect of criminal law, and
in particular to the manner of systematizing and teaching it in
the Universities.
As I see it, if professional practice has not to be presented
in a very complicated manner to the pupils, it cannot be said that
the mission of the University is fulfilled merely by administering
to the student some few practical disconnected principles. In
reality, not even the approximate exactitude of these practical
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CRIMINAL LAW
principles can be guaranteed if there is not behind them, however
modestly hidden it may be, the theoretical, systematic and disinter-
ested elaboration that functions not for the needs of today, but
for those of the future.
For a discipline of cultural character such as law, as opposed
to the natural sciences, the necessity of unity and systematic co-
herence stands out very clearly, because it is almost the only
means of overcoming the merely empirical points of view. Natural
Sciences, such as physics, biology and chemistry are always sub-
mitted to the test of experience. In them also is the necessity of
systematic coherence; but facts and experiments decide their the-
ories and systems. Law lacks this test or, at least, what can be
called experience in law is something very different from physical
experience.
This necessity for systematizing principles is very clear in the
thought of all great jurists. This is what Carrara said: Se il
giure criminae 6 un' arte empirica gettiamo la penna, e cessiamo
di meditare gli arcani principii che come tale non ha ma se il
giure penale 6 una scienza, e vogliamo mantenerlo a codesta sua
altezza, esso deve avere dei principi; e questi non possono ricono-
scersi come veri, quando non sono accettabili in tutte le loro logiche
deduzioni; percha la verita a una, e sotto ogni sua forma deve
risultare verit& (Programma, 1493) (If criminal law is an em-
pirical art let us throw the pen away, and cease meditating upon
the mysterious beginnings that, as such, it does not have. If
it is a science, and if we want to maintain it on that level, it must
have some principles; and these can not be recognized when they
are not accepted on the basis of logical deductions because truth
is unitary and must appear as such in all its various forms.-Pro-
gram, 1493.) It is clear that Carrara's thought is inspired in the
historical rationalist conception of the rights of man; but ignoring
its content, it is a formal truth. A theory of penal law that does
not succeed in building a system can neither aim at the dignity
of a science, nor at the modest dignity of a University discipline.
But it happens that in penal law this need of systematic con-
struction is not a mere idle, theoretical or doctrinal aim. As in all
juridical subjects within the network of the system we, as social
beings, find ourselves confined: we live and suffer the consequences
of these theories on our own selves. This happens in penal law
in a very significant manner, because this is the law that goes
so far as to exact our liberty and even life itself; in writing about
it we always speak of our possible personal destiny.
Thus, we have said that in criminal law the construction on
systematic and methodical bases is not solely a question of doc-
trinal interest. The consequences of the system rebound on the
very contents of the subject. Moreover, the principles themselves
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of the discipline vary according to the chosen method. With re-
gard to this latter point there is nothing so significant as the case
of Mezger. After the Nazi reform of the German criminal law,
the first thing that Mezger changes is the method of studying and
presenting the subject, starting from a new definition of crime.
This methodical alteration is characteristic of all further develop-
ments. The great treatises of Liszt, Mayer, Koehler, Finger and
the systematizations of Beling made from the point of view of
a liberal concept are the very first that the Nazi Minister Friesler
makes a point of sending zum Teufel.
What are the characteristics of that method? The actual start-
ing point lies in the definition of crime. When crime is defined
as a "punishable action", the doctrine remains on a purely empirical
level. It is difficult to ascend from this idea to a structure of
principles that may tell us when an action "must be" punishable.
Let it be understood that we refer to something strictly juridi-
cal and not to a political or sociological "must be." The change
of focus of the problem was the immortal work of Beling. His
point of view was this: to define crime as a punishable action is
to give a definition that is merely nominal, is to define idem per
idem, since what is punishable is what we call crime. The work
of the theorists consists rather in verifying what the juridical
circumstances are that lead to punishment. Punishment is only
the result of those conditions. That idea does not form part of a
definition of crime: it is the consequence of the fact that the deed
should first logically be a crime. These conditions that determine
a punishable act are: that the action should be typically anti-
juridical, guilty and subordinated to a legal definition. The ex-
amination of each of these elements is the growth of the plan
of the subject. A logical and rigorous order of ideas is constructed
by this method, each one of which is based on its predecessor in
order to integrate, in this way, a crime as a whole. The central
nucleus of this conception is the idea that a theory that must be
constructed on the basis of the principle nuilum crimen sine lege
stamps on the definition of crime a character distinct from that
of the ordinary definitions, because it must be, in itself, restricting,
because it must contain something like the reverse of the idea
nuUum crimen sine lege: crimen a lege fit. This idea was first
expressed by Beling when he introduced in the definition the Ger-
man term: Tatbestandmissigkeit, which means subordinated to
a legal definition. This first step has been improved during the
course of 30 years elaboration (since 1906), and I do not think
that I am mistaken when I affirm that the growth of this system
is what exactly corresponds to the structure of a purely democratic
criminal law.
The first thing that must be broken by an arbitrary political
CRIMINAL LAW
system is the restricted definition of each crime. One of the first
acts of the dictators always consists in annulling legal limitations
and particularly in freeing themselves from the restriction of a
penal definition, in order to be able to punish action of any kind,
according to what they consider necessary at the time of the judg-
ment. What worries a dictator most is a pre-established concept
of crime. This inconvenience made itself evident very early in
Nazi Germany, in the reform of paragraph 2 of the Penal Code
which said "an action can only be punished when the punishment
is fixed by law before the action was committed." Now a criminal
law, according to the reform, can be applied not only to the person
who commits a previously defined punishable action, but also to
a person who "deserves punishment" according to die gesundene
Volksanschauung. The idea of restriction in the definition of crime
was put an end to and, what is fiore serious, it happened not only
in the realm of theory.
The juridical theory re-states: crime is what is punishable.
But as what is to be punished is not pre-determined, to speak truth-
fully, it would have to be said that crime is what the judges actually
punish, let it be an action or let it be a personal condition. It does
not seem to be easy that, on a base so frail and empirical, it should
be possible to construct anything that may reasonably aim at
theoretical validity. It is not only the moral dignity of the theory
but its theoretical importance, which is seriously compromised;
what before could consist of a coherent body of principles must now
be framed as a vague approximate mixture of opinions.
Therefore, I must express a certain measure of surprise,
caused by the fact that in a country like the United States, of
democratic feelings so deeply rooted, the University chair, with
very few exceptions, should neither have exceeded the mere em-
piricism of the "case system," nor have noticed the theoretical im-
portance of a solid structure of the general part of criminal law
on the basis of a consciously applied method. The "case system" is
an empiric procedure, suitable to the judge or the practical lawyer,
imposed to a large extent by the Common Law; but if the chair
aspires to the truly constructive disinterested and scientific function
that guides and does not serve empiricism, there is no other method
except the compilation of a system. It is almost inconceivable that
criminal law can be discussed without having a general idea of
imputability, of guilt, of dolus, of negligence, of justification, of
impunity, and that everything must be studied with the motive
of each particular crime and even of every case in every crime.
I have heard a distinguished professor make considerable efforts
to explain in class the difference that there is between these three
forms of killing a man: the negligent, the dolose and the unin-
tentional. It was very difficult for him, because the pupils did
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not known what was negligent, dolose, unintentional. He got out
of the difficulty with incidental explanations, because the object
that they were studying was a case of homicide and not the theories
of guilt.
I suppose the explanation must be renewed whenever they con-
sider one of the numerous crimes, in which these three forms of
perpetration are possible. It is more than this. Even granting
the Common Law system, it is no obstacle that a theory be framed
and developed on those bases. The principle nultum crimen sine
lege is precisely a principle of Common Law. It causes surprise
that some codes expressly contain the Hitleristic principle: e.g.
P. C. of New York paragraph 21; P. C. of California paragraph 4.
Even in both of these a vague reference "to the view to promoting
justice and to effecting the objects of the law" is contained. It is
the force of jurisprudence in the courts that has placed checks on
these dispositions of the codes. Apart from the most recent
Louisiana code, the total lack of system and the empirical ag-
glomeration of paragraphs, which form the common codes, are
defects that must be imputed to the chair because, although the
legislatures are the originators of the codes, it can be said that
the Universities are the real sources of them.
Even when the law has such a firm tradition as it has in the
United States, for university teaching and research, there must be
no limitation of tradition: it is not possible that the work of a
Carrara and what it represents, should not be known because it
is not within the fabric of Common Law, nor is it possible that
the problems of criminal law should not be presented on the same
level on which they are considered almost everywhere.
However bad the codes may be, Common Law is an inexhaustible
source of juridical wisdom that urgently demands technical treat-
ment and not merely practical handling. How admirable it would
have been, for example, if the thought of Carrara, instead of being
sometimes restrained by the errors of a code had had at its dis-
position the precepts of Common Law! What a system would
have been handed down!
